announced its first contract to supply infrastructure only in May 2007. 10 VANS providers are to be given new classes of licences, with at least some being authorised to enter the infrastructure market.
Comparing the prices charged for leased lines by Telkom with those in OECD countries, South Africa is markedly more expensive (see Figure 1) . In 2004, the price of a basket of lines was three times that of Mexico, four times that of Poland and eight times that of Turkey. While the fairness of such comparisons can always be challenged, the very high prices are clearly discouraging businesses considering locating to South Africa, confirming complaints made by international firms. An overall price cap for telecommunications was put in place in the late 1990s, with leased lines included in the basket. While price increases were gradually brought under control, prices have only been partially rebalanced. Under the price cap regime they would never have been fully rebalanced.
12
Without a realistic prospect of competition there was no reason for Telkom to reduce its monopoly prices.
The Electronic Communications Act (ECA) signalled the end of the price cap regime.
Chapter 8 of that Act requires operators to lease facilities to other market players, while Chapter 10 requires the regulator to impose pro-competitive remedies, including wholesale price controls, on dominant operators. Together, these could see significant changes.
In February 2007, the Minister of Communications complained about private sector participation in the market and proposed to "twist its arm", apparently with a view to increasing its participation and in this way to reduce prices. 13 This appears not only to go against international experience, but also commitments made at the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) to create an enabling environment and regulatory certainty. 14 A failure to understand the importance of appropriate market conditions combined with ad hoc decision-making might explain some of the problems of the telecommunications sector.
The United States Trade Representative (USTR), acting on behalf of carriers based in the US and under a direction from the US Congress, has criticised the behaviour of the South African government, the regulator and Telkom in a series of complaints.
15
In 2001, the USTR complained of the failure by Telkom to supply leased lines to service providers because Telkom took the view that the use to which they were being put was infringing its monopoly on basic services. In 2002, the USTR report continued to highlight the disadvantages rivals to Telkom faced under the regulatory regime. In 2003, it argued that South Africa was failing to meet a WTO commitment to allow the resale of basic services. In 2004, it complained about the undermining of the independence of the NRA and the need to permit resale of basic services. Thereafter, South Africa escaped criticism. It was also in 2004 that SBC sold its holding in Telkom SA, perhaps removing the incentive for its domestic rivals in the US to lobby against it. 16 AT&T, then a separate firm, gradually dropped out of the South African market, while Verizon simply did not complain.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ACT 1996
For a decade the primary legislation was the Telecommunications Act. 17 While it has recently been repealed and replaced by the Electronic Communications Act, many elements of the old legislative framework remain as transitional measures, while ICASA replaces the licences and created new regulations. 18 Article 45 of the Telecommunications Act authorised the Minister to adopt price regulations for 'fields' where there was no or insufficient competition. 19 In common with many countries, prices had historically been determined administratively and were frequently out of line with costs. In some instances the costs would not even have been known.
The intention to use a "price cap" was announced in the 1996 White Paper.
20
This was to allow Telkom to bring prices more closely in line with costs, to eliminate crosssubsidies, while keeping rises below the level of inflation. In May 1997, the Minister of Communications made a direction for the use of a price cap.
21
He specified that it should not have a "materially adverse" effect on the ability of Telkom to achieve its roll-out targets. Initially, the cap was not binding, merely an obligation to take all reasonable steps.
The Minister specified the formula for price changes to apply for a period of three years (see below), setting the productivity factor to be 1.5%.
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The prices of "elements" in the basket were permitted to be raised by not more then 20% above the generally permitted rate. The published prices were to be the maximum that could be charged and were subject to the principle of non-discrimination, which Telkom took to mean minimal and identical discounts for only its very largest customers.
Leased lines were one "element" in an overall basket of telecommunications services, though itself comprising many tens of individual prices. However, valueadded services were excluded from the basket.
The effect was to permit a massive increase in the price of leased lines, close to the maximum permissible (see Table 1 ). Looking back, the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) noted that:
"This suggests that either this service was previously greatly under-priced, or that Telkom sees market advantage in raising the price of this type of facility on which competitors to its own services business currently depend." 23 There was no justification given by Telkom in terms of any rise in the underlying costs. It appears to have been an exercise in market power, with the upstream supplier taking profits from downstream VANS, ISPs, MNOs and the owners of private network operators. Telkom, if it were to make efficiency savings, to keep the balance as profits.
ICASA noted that most respondents felt that there was "considerable scope for improvement" in the application of the price controls and an urgent need for greater downward pressure, especially on residential prices, in order to offset the effects of rebalancing.
27
It failed to note that the absence of competition meant there was little pressure on or incentives for Telkom to make price reductions.
Comments had also been made by service providers about the need for the development of a wholesale market, with significant discounts for bulk purchasers.
28
This continued to prove a failing in the South African market structure.
ICASA proposed to reduce from 20% to 5% the maximum price increase permitted for any element of the basket -that is over and above the basket price increasewith a separate sub-basket for consumers in order to protect them from excessive price rises.
29
The productivity factor was to be 5%, in contrast to the suggestion by Telkom of 0%, because it had already achieved "virtually all efficiency improvements possible".
30
Although the regulations were adopted by the Minister, the productivity factor was reduced to 1.5%.
31
By comparison with other countries, the productivity factors have been very low, more typical values would be 5 to 10 %. Indeed in its consultation ICASA conceded that 1.5%
was "fairly undemanding".
32
One justification claimed by Telkom for the low productivity factor was the commitment to expand its fixed network by 2. The list price changes of a small selection of leased line pricing elements are shown in Figure 2 . Although generally downwards, the range of changes in the prices is quite wide, with there being no consistent pattern and with very little advantage being taken of the capacity to raise prices. Any reductions have to be seen against the high starting point of the charges.
FIGURE 2: CHANGES IN LEASED LINE PRICE ELEMENTS AS INDEX NUMBERS
While the prices charged by Telkom are a matter of record, the revenues from these services are not. Telkom filed its revenues with ICASA alongside the proposed price changes -though these were confidential and have never been published. ICASA has seldom made a public statement that it had approved a price increase, rather the 15-day period had been allowed to lapse and the new prices approved by default.
For most of the period of the price cap ICASA lacked regulatory accounts from
Telkom and thus was unable to verify the calculations.
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It could only have taken the revenues on trust and thus their conformity with the regulations. Even with the regulatory accounts it is an extremely complex exercise to verify that the equation
has been correctly applied. Moreover, to do so in 15 days is a considerable and, perhaps, impossible challenge.
The origin of price-cap regulation was in the United Kingdom, where it was introduced in 1984, to be followed by many other countries, often with additional complications to the initially simple model.
45
It was not seen as a standalone tool, but to be used in coordination with other policies, notably the introduction of competition.
46
Price-caps have generally achieved the social equity objectives of constraining price increases for consumers. In the US, price cap regulation was found to generate responses from operators largely consistent with economic theory -prices fell, productivity rose and more modern infrastructure was deployed.
47
In South Africa, the lack of real or prospective competition in most areas meant that Telkom had few incentives to rebalance its prices. In leased lines competition was only to emerge in 2007 on the core inter-city routes, but was still absent from tail circuits.
THE PRICE CAP
The price control regulation imposed on Telkom is shown in Equation 1 
The right hand side of the equation is the Consumer Price Index (CPI) less a productivity factor specified by the Minister of Communications (see Table 2 ). The equation was modified in 2001 to allow any unused price increase to be carried over into the next year. The left hand side of Equation 1 is the ratio, expressed as a percentage, of the Revenue Change (RC) divided by the total Reported Revenue (RR) for all the items in the basket. For each basket "element" the Revenue Change is determined as the Reported
Revenue multiplied by the proposed percentage price change ( P) for that element.
The total Revenue Change (RC) is then the sum of the changes of the n elements in the basket.
Nominal revenues for the next year are generated by assuming no change in demand, or discounting practice, only a change in prices. These revenue changes
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48 A change was made from using a forecast CPI of January to January, which had tended to overstate inflation, to use the data for the previous year from September to September.
49 Consumer Price Index (P0141.1). Metropolitan and other urban areas -Core index.
(2)
are then aggregated by simple addition. The ratio is calculated as the total change in revenue divided by the total current revenues and this is tested using Equation 1.
Individual basket 'elements' are separately tested against a higher figure of 5% more than in Equation 1. So that, for example, leased lines cannot rise by more than 5% more than CPI-X, typically around 2% or 3%, making a ceiling of around 7% or 8% price increase.
Schedule A of the Price Control Regulation of 2001 specified the composition of the basket of charges of which Section 2.6 identified point-to-point leased circuits, including the fixed rental and any distance/capacity dependent elements used in private networks and for private circuits. Sections 1.3 and 2.3 refer to the installation and rental charges for 2Mbits/sec "digital lines".
50
The basket expressly excludes value-added services. Telkom access circuits, for example, for its VPN Supreme service are excluded from the basket, though not those for Internet access or frame relay.
Surprisingly, the basket includes Telex and X.25 (Saponet-P), which would ordinarily be considered to be obsolete services. The risk of Telkom raising these prices would seem slight and might in any event encourage customers to move to more efficient technologies. Their inclusion distorts the basket, though the revenues are now very low.
If a price increase is not used for leased lines or if the prices are reduced, then the corresponding quota of revenue can be used in increasing the price of other services, provided the results conform to the two conditions. The scale of any such contribution would depend on the size of the total revenues for leased lines and any price change. If say, leased line prices were to be reduced by 5% overall, then the contribution available to raise other prices would be the received revenues for leased lines multiplied by (CPI-X) + 5%. Figure 3 shows the CPI, the CPI-X (ie excluding mortgage interest payments), and the CPI-X-R for regulated prices, which includes telecommunications charges.
FIGURE 3: CPIS FOR HISTORICAL METROPOLITAN AREAS (100 = 2000)
The National Treasury conducted a review of administered prices across several sectors.
53
It offered a damning critique of telecommunications price controls.
54
In particular, that:
"It is clearly very unlikely that efficient prices will emerge from the current processes for setting administered prices in the telecommunications sector." 55
It described the regulatory network and the interplay of the various actors (see These addressed primarily retail prices, but noted the following:
the local loop had to be either unbundled or opened for shared access;
self-provisioning of VANS providers had to be revisited; ownership or custody of SAT-3 had to be re-examined and access expanded; the wholesale rate on line rentals for ISPs and the question of leased line costs needed urgent attention.
In her budget speech in 2006, the Minister announced a committee to examine local loop unbundling.
58
One year later, the Minister announced a "policy decision" that unbundling be completed by November 2011. However, the implementation would depend on the analysis of the relevant market to be conducted by ICASA and any regulations.
TELKOM SA
As with many other incumbent operators, the pre-history of Telkom was as a converged provider of posts and telecommunications. It retains many properties and much of the infrastructure from that past. In the case of South Africa this has a heightened political significance, since Telkom closely followed the policies of the apartheid regime, doing little to serve the historically disadvantaged populations.
62
Although Telkom had lobbied ministers and the regulators with arguments in favour of a low productivity factor, it told a very different story to the financial markets in its annual reports and other statements. In 2000, it reported 4-year compound annual growth rates of 19 % in revenue per employee, 14% in operating profit per employee and 15% in value created per employee (see Table 3 ). In 2000 it stated that "Telkom's ongoing restructuring programme is paying off richly with striking improvements in productivity and efficiency during the past year". The advances did not stop then. Table 4 shows the further improvements in efficiency. One part of this was achieved by the successful rollout of workforce management software:
63
The field force team, which delivers service to customers, achieved significant savings through a reduction of the following: the vehicle fleet (6.0%), dispatches due to a reduction in repeat faults, theft and breakage incidents and the cost of fixed-line materials and maintenance (16%).
65
Telkom attributed its successes to having invested in the right skills and having developed a "performance driven culture" in both its management and workforce. Telkom provides point-to-point leased lines both for retail and for resale. However, it consistently pressed customers to obtain these lines directly, rather than through their VANS providers. Telkom struggled to avoid the creation of a wholesale market in which it would have to offer significant discounts to downstream suppliers and rivals. Providers would obtain a "letter of agency" from the end-user to authorise them to procure and to maintain the lines, managing the relationship with Telkom, while the customers had only to pay the invoices.
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In pricing access lines to some of its own services, Telkom offered 'flat rate' or distance Telkom has not been required by ICASA to publish quality of service data and in particular evidence of its performance for different downstream providers. However, it has offered a small amount of information in its reports to the SEC (see table 5 ).
In 2005, Telkom changed the measures reported (see table 6 ), making more difficult comparisons over time and with operators in other countries. Without considerably more data and without it being audited, it is impossible to assess the accusations made against Telkom that it discriminates in favour of its own direct customers and against those of VANS and ISPs. The provision of International Private Leased Circuits (IPLCs) has been limited to Telkom, through its monopoly on access to the undersea cables and thus the provision of International Private Leased Circuits (IPLCs). It has derived considerable revenues because of the high prices it has been able to charge.
The only undersea cable with landing stations in South Africa is variously known as: relatively modest additional cost. 74 However, these improvements have only been partially reflected in the prices charged to customers, because of the absence of competitive access to the increased capacity (see Figure 6) Nelspruit .
As of early 2007 Sentech counted some tens of lines, less than 0.1% of comparable lines provided by Telkom. Moreover, some of these were being used for trials by service providers.
The inability of Sentech to grow in the business market and with a rival service available from Neotel and soon, possibly others, suggests it has substantially failed as a supplier to corporations and VANS. It is doubtful that any potential corporate customer would view Sentech as a plausible supplier over the medium term.
Moreover, Sentech faces massive financial and technical challenges in the switchover from analogue to digital television and in meeting the heavy network demands associated with the coverage of the FIFA World Cup in 2010.
The creation of Neotel as the Second Network Operator (SNO) has been a protracted and painful process. The search for a 'strategic investor' took several years, until the Tata Group was found.
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The various 'partners' fought with each other in private, in public and sometimes in the courts. The Minister pushed together two unwilling consortia, adding to the problems. Each delay meant that the business plan had to be revisited.
From extensive press briefings by Neotel and Telkom, there seems to be some measure of agreement that the former will be able to take no more than 10% market share from Telkom, across the fixed telecommunications market. This has been reduced from 15% and the period required has been extended from three to five years. The first contract was with the State Information Technology Agency (SITA)
for the provision of a bandwidth on demand service for Government Common Core Network (GCCN). 
SELF-PROVISIONING
The Minister announced steps towards further liberalisation, lifting restrictions in the Telecommunications Act, to take effect from February 2005.
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In particular, VANS licensees were to be allowed to carry voice traffic.
Telkom had historically insisted on its right to be the exclusive supplier of any telecommunications capacity that crossed the boundary of any property or carried voice telephony.
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MNOs and VANS licensees were now to be allowed to self-provide telecommunication facilities or to obtain them from any other operator licensed to provide such facilities, including other MNOs and VANS licensees. The prohibition on the resale of excess capacity was lifted, including private or corporate networks.
Neotel was given the same status as Telkom as a supplier of infrastructure.
Telkom has supplied a great many leased lines to the mobile network operators, with all three MNOs being substantial customers (see Figure 7) . The operators had been bound to use leased lines provided by Telkom.
88
These had always been provided below list price, but the discounts were substantially increased just when the MNOs were considering exercising their new powers to construct their own lines or may have been considering switching to Neotel.
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Initially the MNOs concentrated on the construction of 3G and 3.5G radio networks utilising their expertise in the design and construction of the radio access networks. However, by mid-2007, the MNOs were busy constructing their own networks. Despite the confusion and uncertainty over the legality of self-provisioning and the attempts by Telkom to contain rivals there is now evidence of alternative infrastructure. However, it is too early to determine whether this competition extends beyond core long-distance routes and a few metropolitan fibre rings.
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS ACT
The Electronic Communications Act of 2005 was the result of several years of discussion in Parliament over various drafts of a Convergence Bill. The Act implemented a series of reforms intended to liberalise the telecommunications sector.
In part, the Act drew on methods from the European Union legislative package. 100 The definition for this is taken from Section 7 of the Competition Act 1998:
A firm is dominant in a market if -(a) it has at least 45% of that market;
(b) it has at least 35%, but less than 45%, of that market, unless it can show that it does not have market power; or (c) it has less than 35% of that market, but has market power. The changes required by the ECA have imposed a very heavy burden on ICASA, of which the work on leased lines is only a small part. The questions that arise concern the priority assigned to the work and the time it is likely to take to complete the processes, including the seemingly inevitable appeals. This could be worse, if tied up with disputes over unbundling regulations. The process is more likely to take years, than months.
CONCLUSION
The government of South Africa has tried unsuccessfully to manage liberalisation, with the intention of delivering more accessible and affordable telecommunications services to support broad economic goals.
Leased lines are a primary input and cost factor for mobile network operators, value-added and Internet service providers and are the basic building blocks of corporate networks. Yet the supply of that infrastructure has been poorly managed for over a decade. International comparisons suggest the prices are damagingly high for the economy, while even Telkom admits the quality has not been good.
107
The prices of leased lines have not been controlled effectively, having initially been allowed to rise to levels far in excess of costs and although they have since declined, it has been very slow, so that they are still far from being cost-oriented. Telkom was able to leverage its monopoly in the supply of infrastructure to extract substantial profits from downstream operators, service providers and businesses. Moreover, there was no regulatory effort to ensure that an adequate quality of service was delivered without discrimination to all customers or even to monitor what was being provided.
The failure on the one hand was not to introduce competitors and on the other was not to determine the true level of costs. The Minister delayed the admittance of competitors, while the regulator lacked the necessary independence, resources, powers of enforcement and, most especially, information to regulate the incumbent.
The government and the minister created the system and then further compromised the limited capability of ICASA by modifying its decisions.
Under the Electronic Communications Act there is some prospect of prices being brought towards cost, though only over a period of years. ICASA can now adopt regulations without the approval of the minister, though she may still issue directions which could have very similar effects.
The competition that exists is limited to core routes between major cities. Local access remains the effective monopoly of the incumbent.
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Telkom has left no stone unturned to render regulation ineffective. It has lobbied assiduously, taking advantage of the substantial Government shareholding. It has contested decisions to have them overturned or to delay their implementation. It has priced its own access lines differently and, in effect, more cheaply than those it provides to rivals. It thwarted the development of a wholesale market by pushing customers of service providers to buy access lines directly from itself
The introduction of self-provisioning of leased lines was inept, failing to encourage investment in infrastructure. The Minister declared that it was permitted for VANS operators to do so. She then appeared to withdraw permission in order to appease
Neotel which was finally becoming a plausible second network operator. Then ICASA appeared to give permission by proposing wide-ranging licences to VANS providers. 
